A Poison Pell for Public Colleges? Pell Grants and Funding for Public Colleges in the U. S. by Stone, Joe A.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Poison Pell for Public Colleges? Pell
Grants and Funding for Public Colleges
in the U. S.
Joe A. Stone
U. Oregon
15 April 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71761/
MPRA Paper No. 71761, posted 9 June 2016 19:45 UTC
1 
 
 
A Poison Pell for Public Colleges? 
Pell Grants and Funding for Public Colleges in the U. S. 
Joe A. Stone 
Economics 
University of Oregon 
Eugene OR 97402 
(jstone@uoregon.edu) 
April, 2016 
 JEL: H0, I2, J0 
Keywords: college, tuition, education, Pell, Medicaid, taxes 
Abstract 
This study links federal Pell grants to college students in the United States to the decades-long 
decline in state-local funding for public colleges.  The effect is at least as significant as other 
explanations based on taxes, Medicaid, or K-12 funding.  Estimates are obtained from multiple 
identification strategies, including a crossover, repeated-measures (RM) design—a powerful 
design particularly well suited to the Pell program.  The results offer a compelling example of 
how federal funding can induce an unintended cascade of effects even when it is given to 
individuals, not as traditional inter-governmental grants. 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Goldin and Katz (1998) point to a sustained increase in state and local funding for public 
colleges across the United States from the late 19th century to the middle of the 20th century as a 
central factor in building a strong, broadly accessible system of higher education.  However, by 
the latter third of the 20th century, state and local governments were engaged in a great retreat 
from funding public colleges. The extent of the retreat is evident in an array of measures.  Kane, 
Orszag, and Gunter (2002) (KOG) report that appropriations in constant dollars per thousand 
dollars of personal income and as a share of overall state budgets declined by more than 20 
percent after the mid 1970s.  Archibald and Feldman (2006) (AF) note a similar decline.  KOG 
also report that despite a corresponding increase of 39 percent in revenue from student tuition 
and fees as public colleges sought to replace lost public funding, spending per student at public 
relative to private colleges declined by 20 percent from 1977 to 1996 as a barometer for effects 
of the great retreat on the quality of public colleges.  Ehrenberg (2006) also considers effects of 
the great retreat for the quality of public colleges.  This paper tests the provocative argument 
that Pell Grants, intended to make college more affordable for students in the United States are 
instead a major factor in the great retreat.   
Pell Grants were established in 1972 when the U.S. Congress established the Basic Educational 
Opportunity Grant (BEOG) as an amendment to the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965.  The 
BEOG was intended to serve as the floor for federal support for low-income students, with 
other forms of federal aid (direct student loans and the Supplemental Educational 
Opportunity Grant) intended as supplements.  Incomes eligible for the BEOG were 
expanded in 1978, and the BEOG was renamed the Pell Grant by Congress in 1980 in honor 
of Senator Claiborne Pell, the primary sponsor of the 1972 legislation. The 1965 HEA also 
3 
 
established guaranteed student loans, precursors to the Stafford, Perkins, and PLUS student 
loans.    
After rising from zero prior to the Pell program to a peak of more than half of the average cost of 
college attendance in 1977–78, the maximum authorized award has declined to less than half the 
cost of attendance, and participation in the program has expanded well beyond low-income 
students to more than 8 million students. The annual cost of Pell Grants now exceeds 30 
billion dollars.  Until recently, the maximum authorized Pell Grant (MAP) was established each 
year by Congress in advance of each fiscal year, and Congress subsequently set a maximum 
appropriated amount as part of each year’s federal budget.1
A link between Pell Grants and the great retreat is now widely suspected and is reflected 
for example, in a recent proposal by the American Association of Public Colleges and 
  Congress now treats the 
appropriated maximum as an entitlement in the budget by automatically indexing it to the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). Awards for individual students are based on a complex formula for 
contributions expected from the student’s family, tuition, and other costs of college attendance; 
awards vary between a minimum award and the MAP. The appropriated maximum has typically 
been lower than the MAP but has chased the MAP. As a result, the MAP has been a leading 
indicator of the following year’s appropriated maximum, to the extent that the MAP is a better 
predictor of the following year’s appropriated maximum than the appropriated maximum itself.  
From 1972 to 2016-2017, the MAP rose from $1400 to $5815 in current dollars but declined 
from $7529 to $5815 in constant 2014 dollars, which nevertheless, represents a real increase of 
$5815 from zero prior to Pell Grants. 
                                                          
1 Mercer (2005) explains factors involved in setting maximum award levels  
4 
 
Universities to index Pell Grant award amounts to funding for public colleges in each state.2
The implementation and expansion of Pell Grants coincides with the great retreat, but no study 
has identified a direct link between the great retreat and any specific parameter for Pell Grants, 
as is done here. Both Rizzo (2004) and Stone (2012) find a significant role for Pell Grants, but 
neither links the decline to a specific parameter in the program.  Rizzo (2004) identifies an 
indirect effect for Pell Grants (and a possible mechanism for the direct link found here) by 
linking the number of Pell-eligible students in a state to increased funding for direct student aid 
then by linking increased funding for direct student aid to reduced funding for public colleges.  
Stone (2012) uses data similar to those in this study but only identifies an indirect effect using a 
pre/post Pell event design. This study differs from both Rizzo (2004) and Stone (2012) in two 
fundamental ways: (1) it tests for a direct link between the Pell-Grant parameter (MAP) 
authorized at the federal level and funding for public colleges at the state and local level; and 
(2) it uses a repeated-measures (RM) empirical design particularly well suited to identifying the 
direct effect of Pell Grants.  Figure (1) presents visually suggestive evidence and provides a 
heuristic view of the RM design. The two variables plotted over the period 1967-2012 are 
(deltahied), the change in state and local funding for operating expenses of public colleges, 
expressed as percentage points of state personal income and (deltamapk), the change in MAP in 
thousands of dollars, adjusted for inflation.  Some explanation is necessary before turning to 
details in Figure (1).  Five-year data intervals and first differencing  are used in the figure and in 
   
Direct grants have a stronger effect on student enrollment behavior than guaranteed student loans 
(Singell and Stone, 2002), so suspicion falls on Pell Grants rather than on student loans and other 
forms of student aid. 
                                                          
2 (Hurley and others, 2014) 
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later statistical analysis for several reasons: state and local budget data are not available on an 
annual basis until 1977, well after the establishment of Pell Grants;  a five-year interval 
encompasses the two- to four-year cycle in state and local budgets identified by Tucker (1982); 
and according to Hahn and others (2005), five-year differencing aids in smoothing out 
extraneous cyclical factors in identifying low-frequency, long-run effects in time-series data.  
Moreover, five-year differencing has been used successfully in a number of prior studies of state 
and local budgets, including Mofidi and Stone (1990), Bania et al. (2007), and Reed (2008). 
MAP is announced in advance of each fiscal and academic year, and is a strong predictor of the 
next year’s maximum appropriated award, so it is aligned to the five-year intervals by assigning 
it to the year in which it is announced.  Analysis focuses on MAP because i t  i s  a  ce n t r a l  
p r o g r am  p a r am et e r  p r e d e t e rmi n ed  a t  t he  f e de r a l  l e v e l  a nd  h a s  b e en  a  
l e a d in g  in d i c a t o r  o f  t h e  m ax imu m ap pr o p r i a t ed  a wa r d .   The authorized and 
appropriated measures are very highly correlated in five-year data (0.98), and yield equivalent 
results here.  
Turning now to Figure (1), note several salient features.  Even without the great recession period of 
(2007-2012), there are eight nonzero values (treatments) for deltamapk, four increases and four 
decreases, and in all but two of the eight cases, deltamapk and deltahied go in opposite directions 
as hypothesized (They also go in opposite directions in the great recession period).  Given the 
divergent scales for the two variables, the magnitude of the inverse relation is small, but its 
prevalence is strongly suggestive.   For example, in the 1967-1972 period, the figure shows a sharp 
increase in deltamapk and a corresponding decrease in deltahied, followed in the 1972-1977 period 
by a sharp decrease in deltamapk and a corresponding increase in deltahied.  Similarly, in the 
1982-1987 period, the figure shows a sharp increase in deltamapk and a corresponding decrease in 
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deltahied, followed in the 1987-1992 period by a sharp decrease in deltamapk and a corresponding 
increase in deltahied. The two exceptional periods where deltamapk and deltahied go in the same 
direction are 1992-1997 and 2002-2007. 
Figure (1) also highlights key differences between a repeated measures (RM) design, a standard 
difference in differences (DID), and an event study (ES).  For a given number of subjects, RM 
yields a more precise estimate because it relies on multiple treatments (dosages) for each subject, 
not just one, as in DID and ES.3
In ES for example, one probes the robustness to possibly important differences in other factors 
before and after the event.  In DID, one considers possible differences between the treatment and 
control groups.  In RM, one considers those period-specific factors most likely to be important.  
In Figure (1) for example, to what extent are the inverse movements of deltahied and deltamapk 
due to other factors idiosyncratic to each period?  The formal statistical analysis addresses this 
  Unlike DID, RM also has no need for randomized assignment of 
subjects to the treatment and control groups because each subject serves as its own control, so that 
the treatment and control groups are necessarily identical.  Although not always explicitly stated, 
ES DID, and RM each requires a key (untestable) assumption in order to identify the treatment 
effect.  ES requires that there be no important but omitted differences between the pre- and post-
event periods.  DID requires that there be no important but omitted differences between the 
treatment and control groups (often reduced to an assumption that the two groups share a 
common trend).  RM requires that there be no important but omitted period-specific factors.  
Because these assumptions cannot be tested, the standard protocol is to probe the pertinent 
assumption in multiple ways using relevant data.   
                                                          
3 Quinn and Keough (2001) discuss RM and other experimental designs. 
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question directly by examining sensitivity to a variety of period-specific factors, including those 
already identified as important by prior studies.  Stone (2012) relies on a similar strategy and 
data to gauge robustness.   
Section 2 begins with a summary of the major explanations previously proposed for the great 
retreat. Section 3 explains the data and empirical specification of the RM design.  Section 4 
presents the estimation strategy and empirical results. The central result is that a one thousand 
dollar increase in the maximum Pell Grant is linked to a decrease in funding for public colleges 
of  between 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points of state personal income  Section 5 presents results for 
an extensive set of robustness checks, including GMM instrumental-variable estimates and 
placebo tests.  A final section (Section 6) explores the dynamic interdependence of federal and  
State-local decisions and discusses a reform to the Pell program to counter incentives for state 
and local governments to reduce funding for public colleges. 
1. Explanations 
 
2.1Prior explanations 
Explanations for the Great Retreat previously offered include: KOG, who single out the 
rising burden of Medicaid costs and the cyclicality of public budgets in crowding out funding 
for public colleges;4
who emphasizes the costs of K12 schools and the role of Pell Grants; and AF, who focus on 
restrictions on tax revenues imposed by tax-limitation measures enacted in a number of states.  
All these explanations are plausible, and all but the last rely on forces affecting state and 
 Rizzo (2004),  
                                                          
4 Humphries (2000) and Bettinger and Williams (2013) also emphasize the cyclicality of public 
budgets. 
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local budgets nationwide.  
2.2 Pell Grants 
 Rizzo (2004) links increases in direct student aid to reduced funding for public colleges.  There 
are many potential reasons for this pattern, but the most straightforward one is that legislators 
can find it to their advantage to provide aid directly to voting constituents, leaving 
colleges to deal with the consequences, including public ire, and that Pell Grants made 
this strategy more feasible.  For example, Singell and others (2006) find that Pell Grants 
interact with state-level direct student aid to increase enrollments of Pell-eligible students, and 
Rizzo (2004) concludes that ‘As more households in a state become eligible to receive federal 
Pell Grants, states move aid away from institutions and toward students’ to ‘capture increased 
student eligibility for federal grant aid.’  A Mississippi newspaper, Picayune Item (2011), 
suggests the states’ perspective: ‘Cutting Pell Grants will undermine the portion of Mississippi’s 
higher education freight being paid by federal taxpayers.’     
3. Data and Specifications 
 
3.1Data 
Estimation relies on five-year interval data for 49 states and their local governments in the U. 
S. over the half century from 1957 to 2007, just prior to the great recession.  Consistent 
with other recent studies of state budgets, such as Bania and others (2007) and KOG, Alaska is 
not included.  (The dominance of the Alaska pipeline generates outlying variances in Alaska’s 
fiscal variables relative to other states).  In addition to advantages already discussed, long-
interval data provide key strengths in an alternative set of instrumental-variable 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimates (Hahn and others, 2005). 
Data for the state and local government fiscal variables are from the Census of Governments.  
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Related economic, demographic, and other data for corresponding years are from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and the Department of Commerce.  Data for Pell Grants are from the 
Department of Education.  All data are available from public sources.   Summary statistics 
and definitions for the fiscal and Pell variables used in regressions are presented in Table (1).  
(Statistics for other control variables are omitted for brevity). 
Table (1) here 
3.2 Empirical specification 
Estimation begins with equation (1) as a simple baseline to gauge sensitivity first, to additional 
controls for those time-varying factors identified as important by prior studies and second, to 
alternative instrumental-variables estimation.  Equation (1) is a skeletal version of a fully 
balanced, crossover RM design in which each subject (in this case each state) serves as its own 
control in an identical series of treatments of varying intensity (different MAP awards).  
Because the federal Pell Grant applies in all states, a standard DID design, using an untreated 
group of states as a control group is not feasible, but the repeated-measures (RM)  
design expressed by Eq. (1) is a research design with key advantages for examining effects of 
Pell Grants.  
(1) ΔHit = ai + b1 ΔMAPit  + b2 TREND + b3 TRENDBREAK + e1it  
The dependent variable (ΔHit) in equation (1) represents the change in state and local 
government funding for public two- and four-year colleges in state (i) in period (t) in 
percentage points of personal income. (ai) accounts for a trend in the dependent variable 
specific to each state.  (ΔMAPit ) with coefficient (b1), represents the change in the maximum 
authorized Pell award in thousands of dollars adjusted for inflation.  (Using nominal MAP, 
while controlling for each state’s CPI yields equivalent results).  TREND is a linear trend in the 
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dependent variable, and TRENDBREAK represents a break in trend in the mid 1070s (1977), 
near the beginning of the great retreat, as identified by KOG and AF. The time-related variables 
are included only as an initial set of simple control variables in the baseline equation.  The 
treatment effect for Pell Grants is identified in eq. (1) by (b1) the coefficient for (ΔMAPit ).   
In addition to accounting for state-specific trends in the dependent variable, eq. (1) also 
accounts for the nonstationarity of funding for public colleges, which is nonstationary in levels 
but trend stationary in first differences.5
MAP is predetermined at the federal level in advance of each fiscal year. (e1it) is the 
residual error.  Of course, MAP is not randomly assigned across periods, so to it is necessary to 
be confident that the effect of MAP is identified independently of the error term.  Three key 
assumptions are required:  first, that MAP set at the federal level at a point in time be 
predetermined, unaffected by funding decisions for public colleges made at the state-
local level; second, that there be no important but omitted factors correlated with both 
the dependent variable and MAP; and third, that there be no significant  
 Unfortunately, prior studies have failed to account for 
this nonstationarity, which raises concerns regarding spurious regression results.  First 
differencing raises an issue of autocorrelation, and that is addressed using the Wooldridge 
(2002) test for autocorrelation in first-differenced data (which indicates no significant 
autocorrelation), along with robust standard errors for each set of estimates. 
autocorrelation.  The issues raised by the first assumption are addressed by the naturally 
recursive structure that places the announcement of federal decisions ahead of state and 
local decisions.  Results for tests of robustness for the recursive structure are reported in the 
                                                          
5 Tests fail to reject a unit root in levels, but reject in first differences.  
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robustness section using an explicit one-period lag. The issues raised by the second assumption 
are addressed by gauging sensitivity to the addition of an extensive set of state-specific time-
varying controls in an expanded specification expressed by equation (2) below.   These controls 
include the factors already proposed by others as primary explanations for the great  
retreat, as well as demographic, cyclical, and other period-specific variables. The number of 
potentially important period-specific controls is inexhaustible, but adding an extensive set of 
factors already identified as important by prior studies helps to gauge whether estimates are 
sensitive to period-specific controls.  
Au t o c o r r e l a t i o n  i s  t e s t e d  u s i n g  W o o l d r i d g e  ( 2 0 0 2 ) ,  a n d  
I n s t r u m e n t a l - v a r i a b l e  e s t i m a t e s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  G M M  e s t i m a t o r  a r e  
u s e d  a s  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  r o b u s t n e s s  c h e c k .  
 (2) ΔHit = ai + b1 ΔMAPit + b2 TREND + b3 TRENDBREAK + b4 ΔXit  + e2it  
(X) in equation (2) represents a vector of other control variables that includes other elements of 
state and local budgets expressed as percentage points of state personal income. These 
explicitly include those previously proposed by prior studies as important factors in the great 
retreat, such as limited tax revenues (TAXES), rising costs of Medicaid and other health-care 
programs (HEALTH), and funding for K-12 school systems (K12).  For completeness, the 
budget categories for other expenditures not elsewhere included (OTHER) and the budget surplus 
or deficit (SURPLUS) are also included.  SURPLUS is negative for deficits.  A residual category 
is comprised of non-tax revenues and expenditures for physical and public services infrastructure.  
The linear dependence among elements of a state budget constraint that arises from state  
balanced-budget rules limits the interpretation of the effect of any one element to its change 
relative to another element, so our focus in estimates of equation (2) is on the sensitivity of the 
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estimated effect of MAP, not on effects of individual budget elements. 6
4. Estimation Strategy and Results 
 (b3) is a vector of the 
coefficients corresponding to (X).  Other variables included in X include cyclical economic 
factors, such as the unemployment rate (UR) and the log of state per-capita personal 
income (LINCOME), along with a set of variables for age composition of the state 
population. (e2it) is the residual error.  Issues of possible endogeneity for the budget variables 
are addressed below in Section 5 using GMM instrumental-variable estimation. 
4.1 Estimation strategy 
The estimation strategy begins with panel least-squares estimates in Table (2) for baseline 
eq. (1), and then moves to panel least-squares estimates of the expanded specification in 
equation (2).  
The strategy concludes in Section 5 with an extensive set of robustness results, including GMM 
instrumental-variable estimates of equation (2), which do not rely on either the recursiveness of 
MAP or the exogeneity of the controls for identification. 
4.1 Baseline results  
Table (2) here 
 The coefficient for MAP in Table(2) for the baseline equation is significantly 
negative (-0.04) at the .05 level, based on robust (period SUR) standard errors, which are 
clustered on states, since the number of states is much larger than the number of periods, but 
cross-section SUR, which clusters on periods yields equivalent results7
                                                          
6 Mofidi and Stone (1990) and Bania and others (2007) discuss empirical specification of state-
local budget constraints. 
 
7 Explanations of these standard errors are found in Eviews (2009, pp.611-12). 
13 
 
4.2 Expanded results 
Turn now to estimates of equation (2), which is the same as equation (1), but expanded to 
incorporate a large set of period-specific controls to gauge robustness.  Given that state-specific 
trends, a common trend and a break in trend are already included in equation (1), there may be 
little role left for additional period-specific variables, but to find out whether that is the case,  
panel  role least-squares estimates of equation (2) are presented in Table (3).    
Table (3) here 
With the addition of the various controls in equation (2), the MAP coefficient in Table (3) 
increases in absolute value from the baseline estimate of (-0.04) in Table (2) to (-0.07) 
and remains significantly negative.  Hence, the significance of the negative coefficient 
for MAP is not sensitive to inclusion of period-specific budget and cyclical economic 
factors identified as important in prior studies.  The focus in these estimates is only on 
the sensitivity to the inclusion of other period-specific factors, not on the individual 
effects.8
5. Robustness 
  Hence, estimates for the other factors are discussed only briefly.  With the 
exception of TAXES, budget factors associated with other explanations proposed for 
the great retreat (i.e., HEALTH and K12) are insignificant.  Importantly, the Wooldridge 
test for autocorrelation in first-differenced data yields a coefficient of (-0.4) for the lagged 
residual, insignificantly different (p 0.28) from the critical value relevant for first-differenced 
data (-0.5).  
5.1 GMM results.  
                                                          
8 State-level unemployment rates and consumer price indices are included as controls but results 
for these are omitted for brevity.  
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GMM offers an alternative identification strategy to address possible issues of endogeneity, as 
it uses generalized moments of appropriately lagged values of the dependent and independent 
variables as instruments for MAP and the control variables in equation (2).  The fiscal 
variables are likely endogenous, as they are contemporaneous substitutes in the budget 
constraint, but  GMM estimates do not rely on either the recursiveness of  MAP or the 
exogeneity of the fiscal variables.  The instruments are appropriately lagged values of the 
dependent and independent variables.  For first-differenced variables, appropriate instruments 
are two-period lagged levels and more generally, one period prior to the earliest period in the 
first differences). Hahn and others (2005) demonstrate that long-difference data intervals, 
along with appropriately lagged levels of the dependent and independent variables 
substantially mitigate the weak-instrument problem for GMM estimates for highly persistent 
dynamic panel data. 
The GMM estimates presented in Table (4) support to the validity of results for MAP in 
Tables (2) and (3). 
Table (4) here 
  The coefficient for MAP in Table (4) (-0.07) is significantly negative, and equivalent to the 
estimate in Table (3).  Aside from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable included to 
account for possible autocorrelation in the dynamic model, the only major difference from 
Table (3) in the GMM results is that the coefficient for HEALTH is now also significantly 
negative, consistent with the Kane and Orszag (2003) evidence that Medicaid is important.  
The GMM estimates use mean-differenced fixed effects and robust, White-period standard 
errors and weighting matrix, but equivalent estimates for MAP are obtained using first-
difference fixed effects and period-SUR standard errors and weighting matrix.  As for the 
15 
 
validity of the GMM instruments, Hansen’s J-statistic (32.23) fails to reject the exogeneity of 
the instrument set at the .05 level.9 Results of a series of additional robustness checks are 
summarized below, but not presented in detail.10
5.2 Lags. Results for MAP are equivalent whether or not an explicit one-period (five year) lag 
for MAP is also included, and the coefficient for lagged MAP is insignificant, suggesting that 
the five-year data interval is sufficient. 
  
5.3 Changes vs. levels for MAP. Equivalent results are obtained for MAP in levels or changes. 
5.4 Authorized vs. appropriated MAP. Using the maximum authorized or the maximum 
appropriated Pell grant yields equivalent results. 
5.5 Variation across states. There are too few observations to estimate separate treatment 
effects of Pell Grants for individual states, but there are two other ways to look at the extent to 
which the estimates vary geographically.  One is to examine if the estimates are a particularly 
poor fit for any individual states.  This check is done by testing whether individual state 
residuals differ significantly from zero; none of the state-specific residuals differs significantly.   
A second, more thorough approach examines whether the estimated MAP coefficient varies 
geographically by interacting the MAP variable with a dummy variable for each of the nine 
Census regions (in turn) to test whether the treatment effect in any one region differs 
significantly from the overall estimate for all regions.  In this case as well, none of the 
interactions by region differs significantly.  
5.6 Placebo tests. To assess whether there are unobserved factors generating spuriously 
significant correlations between the maximum Pell Grant (MAP) and state fiscal variables, two 
                                                          
9 (Chi-square, 41.37).   
10 Detailed results are available on request. 
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placebo tests are performed.  The first uses health expenditures as the dependent variable in 
both the baseline and expanded regressions.  Health expenditures are attractive as a placebo 
test because even though there is no obvious direct link from MAP to health expenditures, 
KOG demonstrate a significant link from health expenditures to higher education funding. 
Even so, the placebo regressions for health expenditures reveal no significant coefficients for 
MAP.  The second approach uses K-12 funding as the dependent variable.  K-12 funding poses 
a stronger placebo test because many factors affect both K-12 and higher education.   The 
placebo regressions for k-12 funding also yield no significant coefficients for MAP.  Hence, 
neither placebo test raises concern over omitted factors that induce spurious correlations 
between the maximum Pell Grant and elements of state-local budgets.   
5.7 Student loans. The federal guaranteed student loan (GSL) program also authorized by the 
HEA in 1965 may also play a role in the reduced funding for public colleges.  Beyond the 
establishment of GSL in 1965, the most significant expansion of GSL was in 1978 when 
income restrictions on eligibility were removed.11
5.8 Range of estimates. Across the various specifications including the GMM results, the point 
  To  explore whether the estimates for MAP 
are sensitive to the GSL program, event dummy variables for the establishment of  GSL in 
1965 and the lifting of income restrictions for eligibility in 1978 are included (separately and 
together) in the baseline equation.  Equivalent estimates are found for MAP, and there is no 
evidence of a link between either event dummy and reduced funding. GSL may play a 
significant role in reduced funding, but there is no evidence that it influences the results for 
MAP in these estimates. 
                                                          
11 More recently, GLS ‘PLUS loans’ were authorized in 1978 for parents of students and loan 
consolidations. 
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estimates for the effect of MAP fall into a narrow range of (-0.04) in Table (2) to (-0.07) in 
Tables (3) and (4), indicating that a thousand dollar increase in MAP is related to a decrease in 
funding of (0.04) to (0.07) percentage points of personal income. 
6. Federal-State Interactions 
Casual observation and press reports of federal-state interactions suggest the following 
speculation: federal increases in Pell awards lead state-local governments to reduce funding for 
public colleges; reduced funding for public colleges leads to tuition hikes and ultimately, 
further increases in the MAP at the federal level.  
The results of Granger-causality tests in Table (5) offer at least suggestive evidence of this 
dynamic between the federal and state-local levels for MAP and higher education funding. 
Table (5) here 
The results in Table (5) indicate that changes in MAP ‘Granger cause’ changes in state-local  
funding for public colleges, and changes in funding for public colleges ‘Granger cause’ changes 
in MAP.  Neither link is rejected at (.05).  
Given the interdependent dynamics evident in Table (5), the federal government may find it 
worthwhile to consider maintenance-of-effort (MOE requirements for state and local 
governments to increase the ‘flypaper’ effect of federal funding. The flypaper effect, a term 
coined by Fisher (1982) refers to the extent to which federal funding ‘sticks’ to its intended 
purpose or alternatively, displaces state-local funding.  Mehiriz and Marceau (2014) provide a 
recent study of flypaper effects in Canadian municipalities.  Cascio and others (2013) find 
evidence that federal Title 1 funds tend to crowd out state and local funding. Many federal 
programs already incorporate MOE rules for state and local governments to blunt perverse 
incentives that cause federal funding to crowd out state-local funding, and a similar rule may be 
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overdue for the Pell program.   Indeed, an MOE for state fiscal stimulus funding was included 
in the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 2009, and the American Association 
of State Colleges and Universities recently offered a more far-reaching proposal (Hurley and 
others, 2007) to index the MAP available to students in each state to the state’s level of 
operational funding for public colleges to induce greater funding from state-local governments. 
The politics of a stronger MOE are difficult, perhaps impossible. In any event, no MOE 
requirement is unlikely to fully unwind the effects of the great retreat.  Perhaps the most to be 
expected is a slowing of what appears to be a vicious cycle of interactions between the federal 
and state-local governments.  
The full cascade of effects of Pell Grants was clearly not anticipated when Pell Grants were first 
established, and the experience offers a compelling example of how federal funding can induce a 
complex set of unanticipated effects in a federal system even when it is given to individuals. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
(49 states 1957-2007) 
 
 HIGHERED MAP HEALTH K12 TAXES 
 Mean  1.641185  2.095.400  1.320581  4.313326  9.904849 
 Median  1.629214  1.650.000  1.210206  4.285281  9.872397 
 Maximum  3.663851  5.100.000  3.771012  8.438629  17.74776 
 Minimum  0.137900  0.000000  0.423005  2.470914  5.233230 
 Std. Dev.  0.651707  1.785.794  0.577894  0.726956  1.407045 
      
 
 Observations  490  490  490  490  490 
      
Table Notes: 
See text for sources of data. 
Observations in regressions may differ due to lags. 
All state-local fiscal variables in percentage points of state personal income. 
HIGHERED—expenditures on operating expenses of public colleges. 
MAP— maximum authorized Pell Grant in thousands (adjusted for inflation in regressions). 
HEALTH— expenditures on public health, including Medicaid, 
TAXES— revenues from taxes and fees. 
K12—expenditures on K-12 public schools. 
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Table 2.  Baseline equation (1) (1957-2007) 
(change in higher-ed funding in % pts state personal income) 
(Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C 9.201371 3.306312 2.782972 0.0056 
ΔMAP** -0.041952 0.020734 -2.023391 0.0437 
TREND** -0.004525 0.001679 -2.695232 0.0073 
TRENDBREAK** -5.90E-05 2.19E-05 -2.700963 0.0072 
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
          R-squared 0.152551   
Observations: 441 (*sig .10, **sig .05) 
 
Δ— first difference. 
MAP— maximum authorized Pell Grant in thousands, adjusted for inflation. 
TREND—linear trend in the dependent variable. 
 TRENDBREAK— break in TREND as of 1977. 
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Table 3.  Expanded Equation (2) (1957-2007) 
(change in higher-ed funding in % pts state personal income) 
(Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 23.39411 4.794581 4.879282 0.0000 
ΔMAP** -0.066982 0.022699 -2.950855 0.0034 
TREND** -0.011598 0.002426 -4.780445 0.0000 
TRENDBREAK 3.67E-05 3.21E-05 1.143146 0.2537 
ΔHEALTH 0.023130 0.069935 0.330742 0.7410 
ΔTAXES** 0.087093 0.024754 3.518406 0.0005 
ΔK12 0.036904 0.050694 0.727979 0.4671 
ΔSURPLUS** -0.097800 0.018538 -5.275557 0.0000 
ΔOTHER** -0.073182 0.033648 -2.174929 0.0303 
ΔUR -0.008499 0.006279 -1.353701 0.1766 
ΔLINCOME** -0.942884 0.192163 -4.906681 0.0000 
ΔPCT1864** 0.089423 0.017999 4.968244 0.0000 
ΔPCT0517** 0.065210 0.018765 3.475122 0.0006 
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
          R-squared 0.476553       
Observations: 441 (*sig .10, **sig .05)  
Δ— first difference.   
State-local fiscal variables are in percentage points of state personal income.  
MAP— maximum authorized Pell Grant in thousands, adjusted for inflation. 
TREND—linear trend in the dependent variable. 
TRENDBREAK— break in TREND as of 1977. 
HEALTH— expenditures on public health, including Medicaid, 
TAXES— revenues from taxes and fees. 
K12—expenditures on K-12 public schools. 
SURPLUS— budget surplus (or deficit, if negative). 
OTHER— other expenditures not elsewhere included. 
UR—state—state unemployment rate. 
LINCOME—log of state personal income per capita, adjusted for inflation. 
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PCT1864 (PCT0517)—percent of state population 18 to 64 (5 to 17), respectively. 
 Table 4. Expanded Equation (2) GMM Estimates (1957-2007) 
(change in higher-ed funding in % pts state personal income) 
(White-period standard errors and weighting matrix) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ΔHIGHERED-1** -0.101975 0.038716 -2.633947 0.0088 
ΔMAP** -0.070783 0.019981 -3.542494 0.0005 
TREND** -0.018257 0.003011 -6.064290 0.0000 
TRENDBREAK* 5.78E-05 3.45E-05 1.677755 0.0943 
ΔHEALTH** -0.504761 0.139355 -3.622120 0.0003 
ΔTAXES** 0.117537 0.036143 3.251977 0.0013 
ΔK12 -0.053675 0.095263 -0.563432 0.5735 
ΔSURPLUS** -0.194054 0.023713 -8.183315 0.0000 
ΔOTHER** -0.227463 0.036268 -6.271728 0.0000 
ΔUR** 0.027879 0.007604 3.666161 0.0003 
ΔLINCOME** -0.926999 0.462744 -2.003267 0.0460 
ΔPCT1864** 0.141000 0.028082 5.021092 0.0000 
ΔPCT0517** 0.160846 0.024609 6.536053 0.0000 
     
Cross-section fixed (orthogonal deviations)  instruments (2+ period lag levels of  RHS variables) 
     
     R-squared 0.265270   
S.E. of regression 0.318466     Instrument rank 41 
J-statistic 32.23369   
Observations: 343 (*sig .10, **sig .05) 
Δ— first difference.  State-local fiscal variables in percentage points of personal income.  
MAP— maximum authorized Pell Grant in thousands, adjusted for inflation. 
TREND—linear trend in the dependent variable, and TRENDBREAK— as of 1977 
HEALTH— expenditures on public health, including Medicaid, 
TAXES— revenues from taxes and fees. 
K12—expenditures on K-12 public schools. 
SURPLUS— budget surplus (or deficit, if negative). 
OTHER— other expenditures not elsewhere included. 
UR—state unemployment rate. 
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LINCOME—log of state personal income, adjusted for inflation. 
PCT1864 (PCT0517)—percent of state population 18 to 64 (5 to 17), respectively.  
                Table 5. Pair wise Granger-causality tests 
 
             (Two lags 1957-2007) 
    
      Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
      ΔMAP does not Granger Cause ΔHIGHERED** 343  26.2375  0.0000 
  ΔHIGHERED does not Granger Cause ΔMAP**      343  80.3636  0.0000 
        *sig .10, **sig .05 
Notes 
Δ—first difference.   
MAP— maximum authorized Pell Grant in thousands, adjusted for inflation. 
HIGHERED—state-local expenditures on operating expenses of public colleges in percentage 
points of state personal income. 
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Figure 1. Change in State-Local Funding for Public Colleges and 
 the Maximum Pell Grant (five-year intervals, 1957-2012). 
 
Notes    
Delta hied is the percentage point change in the ratio of state-local  
funding for higher education operating expenses to personal income. 
Delta mapk is the change in the maximum authorized Pell Grant in 
thousands of dollars, adjusted for inflation. 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Governments for state-local data and U.S. 
       Department of Education, Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year Reports.  
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